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FACES ON THE COURT HOUSE STEPS

AR.Evmw*
A. F. Neumannt
UDGE FRANK may one day write a book which it will be possible
to take or leave, but I doubt it. Few writers, with his ability and
insight in the field of administration of justice, I suppose, succeed
in evoking in their readers the spirited reactions that his writings produce. This is the highest praise that any reader can bestow-even
though his reaction be a spirited disagreement.
In his most recent book, Courts on Trial, he has attempted to· destroy what he calls "myths" in legal thinking describing the fact-finding
process just as he did for the rule determination and application process
in Law and the Modern Mind. 1 His thesis, which he says he is presenting for "intelligent non-lawyers as wel\ as lawyers," is that the factfinding procedure which lawyers describe as a reasonably certain means
for the discovery of facts in contested cases, differs widely from "court
house government"-the actuality.. He feels that the real danger lies in
lawyers half-believing "a lot of stork stories concerning the birth process
of judicial decisions." The important job to be done, the first, is to let
the people know;2 reforms will not be forthcoming, nor will suspicion
of the legal profession be removed so long as the explanation of our
trial court processes is cast in terms of the certainty of judge and jury
fact-finding.
The great bulk of the book ( 429 pages) is devoted to the development of the observation that the fact-determination process is subject
to many forces which tend to obscure rather than discover the facts in
dispute. Litigation is a fight.

J

* CounTs ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN ,AMERICAN Jusnc:a. By Jerome Frank,
United States Circuit Judge; formerly Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. x, 441. $5.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 FRANK, LAw AND THB MODERN MrND (1930).
2 ''The legal profession, as a whole, however, should not be singularly blamed for the
remediable faults of our legal system. Most of those who comprise any profession or trade
tend to venerate almost all its traditions, to overlook its defects, and are unable to inspect
with much detachment its customary ways. And many noted lawyers, including some members of that conservative lawyers' organization, the American Bar Association, have been
conspicuous as constructive critics of legal and judicial practices, just as they have been
foremost in other phases of American life. Nevertheless, I believe that, to achieve substantial
reforms of our trial court methods, it is necessary to enlist the assistance of the nonlawyers." p. 36.
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"I want, therefore, to stress the fact that litigation in our courts
is still a :fight. The :fighting, to be sure, occurs in a court-room,
and is supervised by a government officer known as a judge. Yet,
for the most part, a law-suit remains a sort of sublimated, regulated brawl, a private battle conducted in a court house." 3
Facts are guesses.
"... proof of those facts, in 'contested' cases, is at the mercy of
such matters as mistaken witnesses, perjured witnesses, missing or
dead witnesses, mistaken judges, inattentive judges, biased judges,
inattentive juries, and biased juries. In short, a legal right is
usually a bet, a wager, on the chancy outcome of a possible future
·lawsuit."4
Lawyers, we are told, disliking the chanciness of judicial fact-finding, seek certainty through the use of the "magical" theory that legal
rules, being relatively certain, must give relative certainty to the outcome of trials.
"The basic component of court decisions consists of the legal
rules. In so far as those rules are crisp and definite, declares the
theory, future court decisions usually are nicely 'foreseeable. Some
few of the rules, the R's, are indefinite, not :finally fixed and settled. To that limited extent, prediction of future decisions is difficult. This lack of precision of some fe:w of the R's is, the pundits
declare, virtually the only impediment to precise prediction. So
that, whatever little uncertainty there may be about how courts
will deal with one's legal rights, it is, for the most part, a function
of the uncertainty in a relatively few legal rules. So runs t:J:ie
theory." 5
Trial tactics, engendered and required by the ":fight" theory of the
trial of issues of fact, supply another source of truth concealment.
Although admitting the ":fight" theory does foster the partisan zeal
which will necessarily call forth certain evidence that might be overlooked in a dispassionate inquiry, Judge Frank points out that the skill
of a trial lawyer is necessarily tested by his ability to use the well-known
devices for the concealment of facts harmful to his case. Through
failing to call unfavorable or questionable witnesses, discrediting adverse witnesses, coaching, cross-examination tricks and the like, the
3 Ch.
4 Ch.
5 Ch.

II, "Fights and Rights," at p. 7.
III, ''Facts are Guesses," at p. 27.
IV, ''Modem Legal Magic," at p. 51.
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trial advocate discharges what he conceives to be his duty: to win a
fight rather than to aid in the discovery of the real facts in issue. 6
Procedural reformers are, in part, devotees of legal "magic" because,
says Frank, in improving procedural rules, they forget the troublesome
nature of the F's (the facts). 7
The facts, as developed at a trial, bear little relation to the true
facts for all the reasons already suggested. Then, in making findings
from these facts, the jury's prejudices, inattention, conscious disregard,
refusal to follow instructions on the law all add to produce a result
even further removed from the true facts. The jury, further, is given
a means of concealing the use of any or all of these in being permitted
to bring in a general verdict. 8
Judges are little better than juries in reaching objective decisions.
Better trained, perhaps, and more experienced, they still are subject to
all the weaknesses, prejudices and failings of humans. 9
The trial judge's decision on the facts is not susceptible of articulate
expression on his part because· it is the result, not of a controlled,
rational process capable of being analyzed, evaluated or described at
any particular stage, but is a "hunch." This "hunch" is the result of
a complex process in which factors incapable of analysis result in a
composite attitude or conclusion-a gestalt. "His decisional process,
like the artistic process, involves feelings that words cannot ensnare."10
Thus, although requiring trial judges to make findings of fact may
be of some help, it will not be a panacea.
In a chapter on "Legal Science" and "Legal Engineering," the
relation of which is anything but apparent, he concludes that a legal
science (to satisfy the lawyers' craving for certainty) is not possible
because the data on which such "science" must be built are group
beliefs and group customs and thus not predictable. The law must deal
with uniques.
Legal education11 shares the responsibility for the perpetuation
of the "upper court myth" and the "rule magic" notions. The case
system built, as it is, around upper court decisions takes no account
of the fact-finding aspects of a judicial trial. The remedy: clinical,
Ch. VI, "The 'Fight' Theory versus the 'Truth' Theory."
Ch. VII, "Procedural Reformers."
s Ch. VIII, "The Jury System."
9 Ch. X, "Are Judges Human?"
10 Ch. XII, "Criticism of Trial-Court Decisions-The Gestalt."
11 Ch. XVI, "Legal Education."
6
7
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"lawyer" law schools, in which students should concern themselves
with actual cases from their inception. In this chapter Judge Frank
robs himself of much of the thoughtful consideration that he invites
in his discussion of the origins of the case system. Christopher Columbus Langdell, its founder, is described as a "neurotic escapist" ;12 his
system, "neurotic wizardy";13 his repudiation of "actual legal practice"
as "morbid."14 The reader is left with the question whether this
rather emotional approach to the case system may not be present
(though less candidly) in the author's consideration of other personalities and problems in this work.
The judicial robe, too, must bear its share of the burden. As a
non-democratic survival, it insulates the judge and courts from criticism, gives the impression of ."uniformity in the decisions of the
priestly tribe," and apparently has the effect of encouraging and continuing the use of incomprehensible legal jargon in the preservation
of the priestly separation of the judge from ordinary men.15
Of the precedent doctrine:
"If I could revise the precedent doctrine, it would require that
a court should never change a rule, retroactively, in its application
to any person when the court has reason to believe that_ he actually
relied on that rule and would be harmed substantially by the
change; hut the court would he free to change an unjust rule as
to all-other persons, both retroactively and prospectively."16
In many respects this is a disappointing book. The great mass
of it is devoted to the single idea that fact-finding, as we presently
go about it, does not lead us to the facts actually present in the dispute.
The whole tone· of the learned marshalling of all the factors that enter
into this result is that the author has .hit upon something which the
entire profession denies. This, I believe, is unfair. Just about all of
our thoughtful legal writers must fall in the author's devotion to this
single idea. Many must fall unfairly because Judge Frank has lifted
a stray quote from some general work and thereby characterized the
complete philosophy of the writer. For example, of Dean Pound he says:
"Roscoe Pound, another highly respected legal thinker, writing of court decisions, states that, from the public judicial records,
12p. 227.
ISP. 231.
14P. 231.
15 Ch. XVIII, ''The Cult
the Robe."
16 Ch. XIX, "Precedents and Stability,"

of

at p. 270.
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always 'one may find exactly ... how the questions of fact were
determined ... in the ·form of special findings of fact' by the jury
or trial judge; that always the judge's findings are accompanied
by a report published by the judge of the legal rules applied by
him; and that, consequently, 'the materials for criticism ... of
judicial decisions are always available and readily accessible.' "17
Yet in 1922 Dean Pound wrote:
. "At common law the chief reliance for individualizing the
application of law is the power of juries to render general verdicts,
the power to find the facts in such a way as to compel a different
result from that which the legal rule strictly applied would require. In appearance there has been no individualization. The
judgment follows necessarily and mechanically from the facts
upon the record. But the facts found were found in order to reach
the result and are by no means necessarily the facts of the actual
case."18

The book is also disappointing in that relatively so little attention
is devoted to the suggestion and discussion of remedies. Remedies
are, indeed, proposed. Experimentation is suggested with the use of
independent governmental officials to dig up and present to courts
facts that the parties might otherwise overlook, suppress, or minimize.19 More general use of special verdicts; special juries composed
of specialists in the field in which the fact dispute arises; revision of
exclusionary evidence rules; recording jury deliberations; and jury
training in public schools and adult education classes are all suggested.20
We might have talking movies of trials so that on appeal upper court
judges might form their own impressions of witnesses and their demeanor. 21 Special training for trial judges is suggested, including
periodic psychiatric examinations to assist the judge in his "voyage
of self-exploration."22 Others are included summarily in cine of the
concluding chapters, "Questioning Some Axioms." In none of these
cases, however, has the author felt called upon to do more than merely
suggest. This is unfortunate, for the reader, convinced that there is
a need for reforms long before the author is apparently willing to concede such conviction, is left facing chapter after chapter of further
1 7P.

53.

18 PoUND, AN Im:nooucnoN To nm PHILOSOPHY oF LAw 133 (1922). Italics supplied.

19 Pp. 97 et seq.
20 Pp. 141 et seq.
21 P. 224.
22

Ch. XVIII.
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"convincing" without the relief and benefit of the author's suggestion
of r~medies. Judge Frank's experience and thoughtful concern with
these problems is such that I am convinced that this would be a far
more effective book were we given the benefit of more detailed discussion of his ideas for reform.
But then the entire purpose of this book seems to be to demonstrate that the profession will not concede that the fact-finding process
is anything other than a "mythical," "magical" rite which always leads
to the discovery of the facts exactly as they were. For Judge Frank,
one must either be wholly content with things as they are, complacently explaining all with "legal magic" or else must agree with him
that the weaknesses typify the whole process. Perhaps it is the privilege of a reformer (and Justice Frank labels himself such) to overstate, exaggerate and characterize his starting point by reference to
its failures and weaknesses. I believe that the truth is somewhere in
between. This book tells us little about the successes of the system,
about the cases in which the weaknesses operate less forcefully or not
at all, about the factors which serve to offset and neutralize some of
the inadequacies.
The dust jacket on Courts on Trial reproduces Daumier's famous
caricature: "Faces on the Court House Steps." One of the figures
represented is self-satisfied and apparently content with himself, his
profession, and with things as they are. He appears to be anticipating
criticism and meeting it with contempt. The other seems to be a
complete skeptic, not sure that there is much of anything that is
capable of being a starting point. I suggest that the great body of
thoughtful members of the profession are not represented in this
picture-but then a caricature is an exaggeration. 23
23 I realize that in the original of this drawing there is a third, minor figure entering
the court house, but we are not permitted to see his face.

